Passchendaele by Andrew Macdonald

Author:Andrew Macdonald
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: HarperCollins Publishers
Published: 2013-04-08T04:00:00+00:00

The pillboxes in the New Zealand sector were those, as discussed earlier in this chapter, captured by 3/Canterbury. The level of tactical skill demonstrated by both Monash’s and Russell’s divisions was of an identical standard, reflecting their time spent in training before Third Ypres and their accrued battlefield experience up to that date.

The same is true of Lieutenant-General Sir William Birdwood’s I Anzac, which was operating to the south of Monash’s division. As in Monash’s sector, Birdwood’s 1st and 2nd Australian divisions were to each attack on a 1000-yard frontage to respective depths of 1200–1800 yards and 1800–1900 yards. Their objectives included Flandern I and the villages of Zonnebeke and Broodseinde. As in II Anzac, Birdwood’s artillery was in position and his infantry deployed on time. In the battle itself, Birdwood’s divisions employed a slightly different attack structure to those used in II Anzac — mostly opting for one battalion to capture the Red Line and two to seize the more distant and heavily defended Blue Line.227 In both attacking divisions, the infantry followed close behind a dense creeping barrage provided by field and heavy artillery and machine guns. Charles Bean’s official history of the Australian Imperial Force provides a litany of examples of Birdwood’s platoons, companies and battalions employing the tactics of fire and movement, and scaling these up or adding additional firepower as the situation demanded.228 Broodseinde showed I Anzac had synthesised the tactics of fire and movement into its training regime after the Bullecourt disaster, at the same time matching its strong performances at Menin Road and Polygon Wood.229 Broodseinde revealed the various divisions of the two Anzac corps were on par in terms of tactical skill,230 and in achieving this they were replicating a British army-wide pattern.

Birdwood was pleased with the results his divisions turned in, but held reservations about operations in the immediate future. He later wrote warmly of his corps’ victory, in spite of the German attack early that morning.231 ‘There can be no doubt as to the completeness and importance of our success …. But notwithstanding our successes to date, the Passchendaele Ridge itself still lay before us.’232 He, like Russell, was concerned about the rain sweeping the battlefield, and was strongly opposed to launching a second attack on 4 October to exploit the day’s gains because his men, too, were exhausted after a day’s fighting.233 He would also have recognised the need to take sufficient time and properly plan a second attack up the ridge. Godley — motivated more by optimism and Haig’s urgings than battle reports and tactical good sense — saw none of this and wanted to commit his reserve brigades and capture Bellevue Spur that afternoon.234 Certainly, engaging and capturing the section of Flandern I that lay before the New Zealand Division would have made good tactical sense, given future attacks were already being planned by Haig and Plumer. But it was always questionable as to whether sufficient infantry could be brought up for such an exploitative attack, and whether the artillery could provide a sufficiently strong barrage to support it.

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